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Proposed strategic framework for the period 2006-2007

Part One: Plan outline

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I. Background

1. The strategic framework for the period 2006-2007 has been prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 58/269 of 23 December 2003 and the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2000/8).

II. Longer-term objectives of the Organization

2. A broad strategic framework for the United Nations in the twenty-first century was sketched by Member States in the Millennium Declaration, and in the outcome of the major conferences held between 1992 and 2002. It must be admitted, however, that the global horizon has considerably darkened since the Millennium Declaration was adopted in September 2000. Clouds such as international terrorism and the deep divisions surrounding the conflict in Iraq have cast their shadow over the international landscape. Tensions based on cultural and religious differences have increased, both among States and within them; and the world economy is plagued with many uncertainties.

3. Yet, in such an atmosphere the vision articulated and the objectives set by the Millennium Summit and the global conferences are no less valid than they were four years ago. On the contrary, the values of freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility remain fundamental, and are more than ever in need of champions. The overriding aim of the United Nations in the years ahead must be to translate those values into reality for all the peoples of this planet.

4. Despite many challenges and setbacks, globalization continues to be the overwhelming reality shaping the destiny of mankind in this new era. Societies in different parts of the world interact more and more rapidly and intensively. This phenomenon offers many opportunities to groups and individuals who are in a position to take advantage of it. Yet, globalization, especially when not managed in accordance with the values mentioned above, has many negative effects. Many millions of people feel that they are its victims. And many more are denied the chance to benefit from it. This is true especially of individuals and families living on the margins of society, and of whole countries — many of them in Africa — that live on the margins of the world economy.

5. None of the above observations is new. This overriding reality has been visible for a decade or more, as have the shifts in international relations that followed the end of the cold war. But the full implications of such momentous changes have yet to work themselves out. There will be many surprises in store, many new lessons to be learned — or old ones to be more thoroughly assimilated. Perhaps the most important qualities for any organization to cultivate, in planning for the medium-term future, are flexibility and the capacity to respond to unforeseen challenges.

6. This is especially true in the area of international peace and security, where threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, while not strictly new, have taken on new importance and present themselves in new and alarming combinations. Indeed, the fear that terrorist groups may have armed or be arming themselves with radioactive or biological weapons has become the single greatest security preoccupation of many industrialized countries. It may not yet be as high on the agenda of developing countries, but clearly they cannot count on being immune.

7. The United Nations must of necessity be in the forefront of the battle against international terrorism, since effective precautions require close cooperation by all States. The Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, set up in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the United States in September 2001, is central to this effort. It plays an important role in maintaining a dialogue between the Security Council and Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, on capacity-building in the counter-terrorism arena. The Committee is now to be strengthened by the creation of a supporting Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate within the Secretariat. More broadly, the United Nations system will continue its efforts to ensure that its actions help reduce the space for terrorism to take hold. Further innovations will almost certainly be required in the years ahead.

8. Similarly, the struggle to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — especially nuclear weapons — and indeed to move in the direction of real disarmament in this area, will undoubtedly require greater multilateral efforts. While enforcement may be necessary in certain cases, it is vital that this be clearly based on multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, which all States must be seen to be implementing in good faith.

9. Meanwhile, demand for United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building must be expected to continue — notably in Africa, but by no means only there. A United Nations force will soon be deployed in Haiti. Many such new missions, like those already at work in Kosovo and Afghanistan, must expect to be there for the long haul; and others will surely follow. This is not a temporary phenomenon. The United Nations must expect to continue to face many demands for conflict management, in a wide variety of senses, and its capacity to meet such challenges will need to be strengthened.

10. Yet, even when conflicts are successfully managed or brought to an end, their very existence marks a failure of the primary purpose of the United Nations, which is to *prevent* and remove threats to the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means the adjustment or settlement of disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. In recent years the Security Council and the General Assembly have placed a steadily increasing emphasis on the *prevention of armed conflict* — especially civil war — and on the need to give serious attention to the root causes of conflict, including economic, social and cultural factors, long before a society reaches the brink of large-scale violence. The recent commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda has further underlined the urgency of such efforts, and is a reminder that genocide almost invariably occurs in the context of war and that therefore the prevention of armed conflict must be a central element in any credible plan to prevent the recurrence of genocide.

11. For the majority of the world's inhabitants the most immediate threats are those generally associated with poverty, or those to which the poor are more vulnerable than the rich. Such threats include hunger, lack of sanitation or safe drinking water, environmental degradation, violent crime, civil conflict fought with low-technology weapons, and endemic or epidemic diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS.

12. Even from a security perspective, therefore, it is imperative that the United Nations continue to give pride of place to the promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development — that is, to fighting poverty and inequality. In

this area, the Millennium Summit and the major conferences identified precise, time-bound goals, by which progress will be measured 15 years into the new century. These goals, which have become known as the Millennium Development Goals, can only be achieved by the peoples and Governments of the States Members of the United Nations.

13. At the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, developing countries undertook, in their own interests, to improve governance and create conditions favourable to investment. But many cannot do this without assistance. It was clearly recognized that special efforts are also needed from the developed countries. They have a vital role to play, both in the provision of increased official development assistance and in the further development of an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system, as well as in dealing comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems, providing access to affordable licit drugs in developing countries, and making available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies.

14. But in none of these areas can it be left to the richest countries to take all the decisions. On the contrary, it is vital that the voice of developing countries be heard, and that they be given a bigger role in the various forums where decisions are made.

15. Africa continues to lag behind the rest of the developing world by most indicators, and to suffer more than its share of the misery entailed by violent conflict, poverty and disease. Yet African leaders are now tackling these problems with greater energy and commitment than ever before. The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development provide mechanisms for more effective intra-African solidarity, notably in the area of conflict resolution, and also offer more credible African interlocutors for those outside Africa who are interested in a genuine partnership with it. One of the key roles of the United Nations in the years ahead will be to support such partnerships, and help to ensure that they have real content.

16. Africans have also taken the initiative in developing new institutions and capacities for conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building. The United Nations, which has already done much to consolidate peace in African countries, from Mozambique to Sierra Leone, will be expected to support these home-grown efforts and indeed to participate in them — sometimes even playing a leading role, as it is currently doing in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

17. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Africa's destiny in recent years has been the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in many countries. This has emerged not only as a human tragedy of unbearable proportions, but also as a major obstacle to development, thwarting and reversing several decades of gains in life expectancy and economic growth. But, while Africa has been the first to feel the full shock of this scourge, it is clearly global in scope. Regions such as east and south Asia and the former Soviet bloc may be close to an explosion of infection rates. In any event, the struggle against this global epidemic is bound to be a top priority for the United Nations system for many years to come.

18. Sustainable development rests on three pillars: economic and social development and environmental protection. All three of these are of vital importance to developed and developing countries alike. In particular, the threat to which the

Millennium Declaration refers, of living on a planet irredeemably spoilt by human activities and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for human needs, is one that menaces the whole of humanity. Devising and implementing a global response to it may even come to be seen, in the decades ahead, as the most urgent priority of all for the United Nations.

19. At least since the Johannesburg summit, it has been clear that issues such as energy efficiency, and the development of new and sustainable energy sources, must be at the centre of policy debate. Ensuring the equitable and sustainable exploitation of global public goods, and in particular of the "global commons", continues to be a major challenge to global governance, and one that so far remains unmet. Likewise, policies for slowing down, and adapting to, climate change remain at best unevenly implemented, even as evidence that climate change is indeed happening continues to accumulate. Two years after the deadline set in the Millennium Declaration, the Kyoto Protocol has still not entered into force; and even when it does, it will be far from providing in itself a sufficient answer to this challenge.

20. In short, it is anticipated that more will be demanded of the environmental programmes and activities of the United Nations in the medium term.

21. More will also be required of the United Nations human rights machinery. Over the last few years, terrorism has emerged as one of the most serious challenges, perhaps the most serious, to universal human rights. Terrorism is in itself a direct affront and threat to human rights and other universal values. But it also exploits the open nature of free societies, and thereby provokes them to restrict freedom in their efforts to defend themselves against it.

22. Indeed, as indicated in the 2003 report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, terrorism has already helped to produce a global atmosphere in which human rights long established in principle, if not in practice, are being questioned, and hard-won advances made by democracy in the 1990s are threatened with reversal. Acts of racism, anti-Semitism and islamophobia are increasing, and threaten to set people of different religion or culture against each other, both in the global arena and in the domestic politics of many States. As in the cold war, human rights violations tend to be overshadowed, or even justified, by the overriding imperative of national security. Even the struggle to control drug trafficking and prevent crime — vitally important in itself — has been conducted, in some countries, with scant regard for human rights.

23. Yet human rights and good governance remain as important as ever in the struggle for development. Inculcating respect for the rule of law, both by authority and by example, is of crucial importance in national as in international affairs.

24. Longer-term processes connected with globalization also pose challenges to human rights and democracy. Migration in particular, however economically and culturally beneficial to recipient countries, continues to be met with reactions and policies that often infringe the human rights of migrants directly, but also, by inciting them to adopt clandestine or illegal routes, render them more vulnerable to the outrageous abuses of smugglers and traffickers in human beings.

25. The big challenge for all countries, in the years ahead, will be to translate agreed norms of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to which they are already committed by international conventions and other legally binding

instruments, into actual practice. The United Nations will need to work closely with its Member States to help them to improve their capacities in this area.

26. The increased use of religion and ethnicity to identify friends and enemies in violent conflicts also contributes to the targeting of civilian populations, including women and children, and lack of respect for the non-combatant status of humanitarian workers, including those of the United Nations. At the same time, the almost exclusive priority given by the international media and political system to certain conflicts, such as that in Iraq, makes it increasingly difficult to mobilize resources for the relief of victims of other, less publicized conflicts, particularly in Africa. It also tends to obscure the fact that a large majority of those in need of emergency relief are not victims of conflict as such, but of natural disasters. Correcting these misconceptions will be one of the major challenges facing the United Nations in its role as advocate and coordinator of humanitarian assistance efforts in the years ahead.

27. As the world changes, the United Nations must continue the process of renewal and adaptation. The effort to improve it as an instrument in the hands of the peoples of the world, which they can use to forge a united response to shared threats and shared needs, is one that must by its very nature be permanent and continuous. All the principal organs of the United Nations are in need of reform. Also, an ever-increasing variety of non-governmental actors are involved in international affairs, and the United Nations needs to adapt its structures and policies so as to take greatest advantage of the contributions that they have to offer at the deliberative stage, while preserving the unique responsibility of Governments to take legislative decisions.

28. While forceful action to maintain or restore international peace and security is likely to remain the prerogative of Member States acting with the authority of the Security Council, it seems certain that the United Nations will be called upon as much as ever, and perhaps more than ever, to intervene in less drastic manner in a wide variety of situations. Its capacity to react rapidly to a wide variety of demands will therefore be of vital importance, and Member States will need to make sure that resources commensurate with these growing demands are allocated.

29. Much still needs to be done to make the Organization more efficient, and to ensure that the reports, meetings and other activities of the United Nations reflect changing global priorities. It is with that in mind that this strategic framework for the years 2006-2007 has been drawn up.

III. Structure and format

A. Background

30. The General Assembly, in its resolution 58/269 of 23 December 2003, having considered the reports of the Secretary-General entitled "Intergovernmental review of the medium-term plan and the programme budget" (A/57/786) and "Improvements to the current process of planning and budgeting" (A/58/395 and Corr.1), the note by the Secretary-General entitled "Improvements to the current process of planning and budgeting" (A/58/600) and the reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions thereon (A/58/7/Add.5 and

A/58/610), requested the Secretary-General to prepare for submission to the Assembly at its fifty-ninth session a strategic framework for the biennium 2006-2007, to replace the current four-year medium-term plan.

31. The strategic framework comprises Part One: Plan outline, reflecting the longer-term objectives of the Organization, and Part Two: Biennial programme plan. The Assembly affirmed that the strategic framework shall constitute the principal policy directive of the United Nations and shall serve as the basis for programme planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, in accordance with the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation.

32. The strategic framework for the period 2006-2007 is a translation of legislative mandates into programmes and subprogrammes. Part One: Plan outline, reflecting the longer-term objectives of the Organization as required by General Assembly resolution 58/269, discusses the overall challenges facing the Organization, taking due account of the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the outcome of the major United Nations conferences and international agreements since 1992. Also included in Part One are the priorities proposed for the biennium 2006-2007.

33. Part Two: Biennial programme plan replaces the current four-year medium-term plan and covers 26 programmes, which, for the most part, are structured in the same way as those in the medium-term plan for the period 2002-2005. Each programme corresponds to the work carried out by an organizational entity, usually at the departmental level (and congruent with the relevant section of the programme budget), and is subdivided into a number of subprogrammes, each of which in turn corresponds to an organizational entity generally at the level of a division. The international drug control programme and the crime prevention and criminal justice programme have been combined and now constitute the international drug control, crime prevention and criminal justice programme (new programme 11).

34. In order to meet the requirement of the General Assembly in its resolution 58/269 that the programme narrative of the programme budget fascicles be identical to the biennial programme plan, modifications have been made to programme 24, Management and support services, to include in greater depth the work being carried out at offices away from United Nations Headquarters, namely Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi. Furthermore, a new programme, Jointly financed activities (programme 26), has also been included in the strategic framework to reflect the work carried out by the International Civil Service Commission, the Joint Inspection Unit, the Chief Executives Board for Coordination and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

35. The preparation of the Part Two: Biennial programme plan has involved not only the participation of all departments but also the review by relevant specialized intergovernmental bodies of those programmes falling within their sphere of competence. Recommendations by those bodies for modifications to the proposed biennial programme plan have been incorporated when available. In cases where it has not been possible to incorporate changes because of the scheduling of meetings, the recommendations of those intergovernmental bodies will be made available to the Committee for Programme and Coordination at the time of its review.

B. Legislative mandates and collective responsibility

36. Legislative mandates, a listing of which appears at the end of each programme, are addressed to Governments, intergovernmental bodies, United Nations organizations, and other entities, as well as to the Secretary-General. Programmes and subprogrammes are established to ensure the successful implementation of those legislative mandates. Responsibility for the success of the programme is therefore neither the exclusive preserve of Member States (acting individually or in intergovernmental organs) nor of the Secretariat. It is a collective responsibility, and success in achieving the objectives and expected accomplishments is a measure of the degree of success of the international community, working in a harmonious partnership between Member States and the Secretariat.

37. Based on this principle of collective responsibility, the objectives, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement have been formulated to address not only the work of the Secretariat, but also the achievement of the subprogramme as a whole in terms of benefits or positive changes for its intended beneficiaries. Member States request the Secretary-General for assistance or for collaboration in, for example, peace operations, electoral processes, application of international norms and standards, compliance with obligations under international instruments, economic and social development, etc. Sometimes the work of the Secretariat involves collaboration and cooperation with other United Nations entities, civil society and the private sector in pursuit of the objectives. The positive changes sought are the consequence of many stakeholders.

38. There are general mandates that provide the overall orientation of programmes and subprogrammes, and there are specific mandates that require the Secretary-General to undertake a particular activity or to deliver a specific output. This distinction is an important one for the preparation of a plan since the planning stage focuses on a strategy to translate general legislative mandates into expected accomplishments, while the budget preparation stage takes fully into account the specific requests for individual outputs. The listing of outputs, therefore, does not appear in the strategic framework; it will appear only in the programme budget document.

C. Contribution versus attribution

39. While some of the expected accomplishments of the Secretariat cannot be entirely attributable to the Secretariat alone, because of the many stakeholders concerned, it is nevertheless feasible to acknowledge that a plausible claim can be made that the activities undertaken and outputs/services delivered by the Secretariat — when properly designed and effectively implemented — contributed to those results. This claim can be further justified by the fact that programme managers, at the budget preparation stage, are required to determine the nature and scope of activities/outputs and select those that would ensure achievement of the expected accomplishments that have been reflected in the biennial programme plan.

D. Format of the strategic framework

40. The structure of the biennial plan in Part Two follows the same structure as in the current medium-term plan for the period 2002-2005. Each programme includes: (a) overall orientation, reflecting the raison d'être of the programme as a whole, changes as a result of the programme's intervention, and the anticipated benefits for its end-users; (b) subprogrammes; and (c) a listing of legislative mandates. Each subprogramme follows results-based budgeting concepts with respect to the use of the logical framework, reflecting the following elements: (a) objective of the Organization; (b) expected accomplishments of the Secretariat; and (c) indicators of achievement, all contained in a table similar to that appearing in the programme budget document. Each subprogramme includes the strategy to be employed for attaining the expected accomplishments.

41. Through the use of the logical framework, namely, clearer articulation of objectives (the raison d'être of the subprogramme), expected accomplishments (benefits to end-users as a consequence of outputs in order to meet the objective) and indicators of achievement (to measure whether or not accomplishments were attained), programme managers are provided with the basic tools for determining the relevance, usefulness, efficiency and effectiveness of the work of the Organization. The practice of results-based management in the implementation of the mandated programmes and activities is intended to improve the performance of the Secretariat and ensure a fully results-oriented Organization.

E. Objective of the Organization

42. The objectives are expressed at the level of the Organization (Member States and Secretariat), rather than at the level for either intergovernmental or Secretariat action only. In other words, the objective reflects what the subprogramme intends to achieve, not what needs to be done by the entity responsible for implementing the subprogramme. For example, an objective might be "to maintain international peace and security through prevention, control and resolution of conflicts through peaceful means", an objective of the Organization as a whole, but not "to monitor and analyse situations of potential conflict", an activity which is carried out by the Department of Political Affairs. The objective, in terms of the logical framework for programme design, is at the highest level.

43. Efforts have been made to be succinct, capturing the essence of the subprogramme and reflecting language that has been adopted by Member States. The objectives stated in Part Two: Biennial programme plan are not limited to a two-year period.

F. Expected accomplishments of the Secretariat

44. Expected accomplishments (also known as "expected results") are intended to reflect the consequence of the products and services to be delivered by the Secretariat within a two-year period. Expected accomplishments show benefits to end-users and it was therefore incumbent upon programme managers to pay particular attention to the many categories of targeted beneficiaries. Expected accomplishments, when they occur, lead to the fulfilment of the objective. In other

words, in terms of the hierarchy of programme design, expected accomplishments appear at a lower level than the objective.

45. While a subprogramme might have many individual expected accomplishments, a determination has been made to highlight the ones that are key and most representative of the subprogramme.

G. Indicators of achievement

46. Major efforts were made to select key indicators of achievement that are clearly linked to the expected accomplishments, that are useful for determining the difference made by the subprogramme and that are measurable. The indicators, for the most part, have been formulated to show exactly the data that will be collected for the measurement of the expected accomplishments. The challenge was to pare down the large number of possible indicators that could be used during the course of implementation and select instead, at the stage of planning, only the key or strategic ones that would be meaningful and helpful for determining whether or not results occurred. At the implementation level, however, more indicators could be used to measure other aspects of the subprogramme's work. It is stressed that the indicators would measure only the contribution made by the entity implementing the subprogramme, and would not measure the contribution made by other stakeholders.

47. Performance measurement is not easy. The selection of key indicators turned out to be a difficult exercise, not unlike what has been experienced at the national level and by other entities of the United Nations system. Nevertheless, improvements have been made since the introduction of results-based budgeting concepts four years ago and there is clear evidence of many more indicators that are measurable and articulated in a way that would show exactly the data that will be collected. The performance measures, namely the baselines and targets, do not appear in the biennial programme plan, but will be included in the programme budget document.

48. Some might argue that the indicators of achievement have not gone far enough in terms of measurability. For instance, "An increase in the number of national institutions applying international standards" would be better expressed as "An increase by 10 per cent in the number of national institutions applying international standards". While it is true that such a target would ensure greater accountability, "An increase in the number of ..." is nevertheless measurable. The addition of "by 10 per cent" is the next step after further experience gained in the analysis of trends on the basis of data collected for measuring results.

H. Strategy

49. The strategy ("how are we getting there?") highlights the focus of efforts to be made within a two-year period to meet the needs of intended beneficiaries. The strategy reflects the approach to be taken to ensure that the expected accomplishments occur, not the activities to be undertaken or the outputs to be delivered. For example, a strategy could be "ensuring that development issues are adequately addressed in intergovernmental debate", and not "conducting a meeting" or "preparing a report", which are activities.

50. There was a tendency in past medium-term plans to capture everything that was being carried out by the subprogramme and descriptions of activities appeared throughout. Concerted efforts have therefore been made to avoid referring to specific outputs in Part Two: Biennial programme plan since these would appear in the programme budget.

I. Lessons learned

51. The medium-term plan for the period 2002-2005 was the first plan to apply the logical framework showing the causal relationship among objectives, strategy, expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement, pursuant to the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, Budgeting, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation. The Secretary-General, in his interim report on results-based budgeting for the biennium 2002-2003 (A/57/478) drew attention to the experience gained and lessons learned as well as to the problems encountered. Many of the difficulties encountered then continue to persist. Continuous training and ongoing support is necessary to help departments change their management culture towards one that focuses on attaining results instead of on delivering outputs.

52. Learning by doing was a key factor in moving forward the implementation of results-based budgeting as was reflected in improvements made — and welcomed by the Committee for Programme and Coordination, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the General Assembly — to the logical framework presented in the programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005.

53. The workshops conducted during 2002-2003, the reporting on results in the programme performance report for the biennium 2002-2003 (A/59/69) and the briefings/clinics conducted for the preparation of the biennial programme plan have contributed to a greater understanding of the logical framework and its implications for (a) management of the work programme towards achieving results; and (b) subsequent feedback into programme design and programme implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

54. There is, of course, room for improvement and the Department of Management is working closely with the Office of Internal Oversight Services, which is responsible for the monitoring and evaluation components of the programme planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation cycle, to be more proactive in facilitating departments to become fully results-oriented. Action continues to be taken for improving data systems, establishing standards, developing manuals and guidelines, and conducting training.

55. Planning is a tool that provides a framework within which Member States can review the work of the Organization as a whole and within which the Secretary-General can prepare his biennial programme budgets. Planning enforces a measure of discipline upon the Secretariat for translating accurately legislative mandates and for determining expected accomplishments, prior to implementation, in order to achieve agreed objectives. Given that the objectives of much of the work of the United Nations are not always attainable within a two-year period, planning assumes even greater importance for understanding, with the guidance of Member States, the direction in which the Secretariat should head in the longer term. Planning, a general overview reflecting the role of the Organization, establishes the backdrop against

which the work to be undertaken is determined. Planning provides the basis for the preparation of the programme budget, which details the selection of outputs or services and the justification for resource requirements for ensuring that the expected accomplishments occur.

IV. Priorities for the period 2006-2007

56. The persistent problems and challenges of the future identified in the current strategic framework will continue to be both valid and relevant to the Organization over the period 2006-2007. It is recalled that for the two plan periods 1998-2001 and 2002-2005, there were eight priority areas identified by the General Assembly, which covered the great bulk of substantive activities of the Organization. As the conditions which led to these priorities continue to persist, it is proposed that the General Assembly consider reaffirming the following priorities for the period 2006-2007, namely:

(a) Maintenance of international peace and security;

(b) Promotion of sustained economic growth and sustainable development in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and recent United Nations conferences;

(c) Development of Africa;

(d) Promotion of human rights;

(e) Effective coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts;

(f) Promotion of justice and international law;

(g) Disarmament;

(h) Drug control, crime prevention and combating international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.